Abstract-Existing work on privacy-preserving data publishing cannot satisfactorily prevent an adversary with background knowledge from learning important sensitive information. The main challenge lies in modeling the adversary's background knowledge. We propose a novel approach to deal with such attacks. In this approach, one first mines knowledge from the data to be released and then uses the mining results as the background knowledge when anonymizing the data. The rationale of our approach is that if certain facts or background knowledge exist, they should manifest themselves in the data and we should be able to find them using data mining techniques. One intriguing aspect of our approach is that one can argue that it improves both privacy and utility at the same time, as it both protects against background knowledge attacks and better preserves the features in the data. We then present the Injector framework for data anonymization. Injector mines negative association rules from the data to be released and uses them in the anonymization process. We also develop an efficient anonymization algorithm to compute the injected tables that incorporates background knowledge. Experimental results show that Injector reduces privacy risks against background knowledge attacks while improving data utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Agencies and other organizations often need to publish microdata, e.g., medical data or census data, for research and other purposes. Typically, such data is stored in a table, and each record (row) corresponds to one individual. Each record has a number of attributes, which can be divided into the following three categories. (1) Attributes that clearly identify individuals. These are known as explicit identifiers and include Social Security Number, Address, Name, and so on. (2) Attributes whose values can be known from other sources, e.g., publicly-available databases such as a voter registration list. These attributes when taken together can potentially identify an individual; thus they are known as quasi-identifiers.
These may include, e.g., Zip-code, Birth-date, and Gender. (3) Attributes that are considered sensitive, such as Disease and Salary.
While releasing microdata gives useful information to researchers, it presents disclosure risk to the individuals whose data are in the table. Two types of information disclosure have been identified in the literature [1] , [2] : identity disclosure and attribute disclosure. Identity disclosure occurs when an individual is linked to a particular record in the released table. Attribute disclosure occurs when new information about some individuals is revealed, i.e., the released data makes it possible to infer the characteristics of an individual more accurately than it would be possible before the data release. Identity disclosure often leads to attribute disclosure. Once there is identity disclosure, an individual is re-identified and the corresponding sensitive values are revealed. Attribute disclosure can occur with or without identity disclosure.
To limit disclosure risk, Samarati and Sweeney [3] , [4] , [5] introduced the k-anonymity privacy requirement, which requires each record in an anonymized table to be indistinguishable with at least k-i other records within the dataset, with respect to a set of quasi-identifiers. We say that these records form an equivalence class. To achieve k-anonymity, Samarati and Sweeney used both generalization and tuple suppression for data anonymization [3] , [4] . Generalization replaces a value with a "less-specific but semantically consistent" value and tuple suppression removes an entire record from the table.
The k-anonymity property aims at protecting against identity disclosure, and does not provide sufficient protection against attribute disclosure. This has been recognized by several authors, e.g., [6] , [7] , [8] . Machanavajjhala et al. [6] identified two attacks on k-anonymity. In the homogeneity attack, while an equivalence class may contain at least k records, it is possible that all records have the same sensitive attribute value, enabling the adversary to infer the sensitive attribute value of individuals in the equivalence class. Even if not all records have the same value, probabilistic inference is still possible. In the background knowledge attack, the adversary may possess background information that enables her to eliminate some values from the set of sensitive attribute values in an equivalence class and then infer the sensitive value with high precision. The background knowledge that an adversary has may be some known facts, e.g., a male patient cannot have ovarian cancer, or some public demographical information about a specific group, e.g., it is unlikely that a young patient of certain ethnic groups has heart disease. A powerful adversary with these additional information can make more precise inference on the sensitive values of individuals.
To address the limitations of k-anonymity, Machanavajjhala et al. [6] introduced a new notion of privacy, called £-diversity, which requires that each equivalence class has at least f "wellrepresented" values. To achieve £-diversity, anonymization approaches other than generalization have been proposed. Recently Xiao and Tao [9] introduced the Anatomy technique to achieve £-diversity. While £-diversity directly prevents the homogeneity attack, it does not satisfactorily deal with the background knowledge attack. We illustrate background knowledge attack in Section II and show that the anatomizing algorithm proposed in [9] is especially vulnerable to this attack. We also empirically evaluate the vulnerability of the anatomizing algorithm in Section VI.
The main challenge of dealing with background-knowledgebased attack lies in how to model the adversary's background knowledge. We believe that it is unreasonable to require manual specification of the background knowledge an adversary may have. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to model the adversary's background knowledge. Our approach is to generate such knowledge by mining the data to be released. The rationale of our approach is that if certain facts or knowledge exist, they should manifest themselves in the whole table and we should be able to find them using data mining techniques. We then use the mined knowledge in the data anonymization process. One intriguing aspect about our approach is that one can argue that it improves both privacy and utility at the same time, as it both protects against background knowledge attacks and better preserves features in the data.
Based on this rationale, we propose the Injector framework for data anonymization. Injector first mines negative association rules from the data using data mining techniques and then uses them in the data anonymization process. A negative association rule is an implication saying that some combination of the quasi-identifier values cannot entail some sensitive attribute values. We also develop an efficient anonymization algorithm to incorporate these negative association rules. Finally, we show the effectiveness of our approach in both protecting privacy and improving data utility through experiments on a real dataset.
While Injector uses only negative association rules as the adversary's background knowledge, using other types of background knowledge is possible but is beyond the scope of this paper. We provide more discussion of using other types of background knowledge in Section VIII.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We illustrate the background knowledge attack against Anatomy in Section II and present the Injector methodology in Section III. We discuss negative association rule mining in Section IV and show how to use negative association rules in data anonymiza -TABLE II   THE ANATOMIZED TABLE   ZIP Code Age Sex Group-ID  1  47677  29  F  1  2  47602  22  F  1  3  47678  27  M  1  4  47905  43  M  2  5  47909  52  F  2  6  47906  47  M  2  7  47605  30  M  3  8  47673  36  M  3  9  47607  32  M  3 (a) The quasi-identifier tion in Section V. Experimental results are presented in Section VI and related work is discussed in Section VII.
In Section VIII, we discuss limitations of our approach and avenues for future research.
II. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ATTACK AGAINST ANATOMY
Recently, Xiao and Tao [9] introduced Anatomy as an alternative anonymization technique to generalization. Anatomy releases all the quasi-identifier and sensitive data directly into two separate tables. For example, the original table shown in Table I is decomposed into two tables, the quasi-identifier table  (QIT) in Table 11 (a) and the sensitive table (ST) in Table 11(b).  The QIT table and the ST table are then released. The authors also proposed an anatomizing algorithm to compute the anatomized tables. The algorithm first hashes the records into buckets based on the sensitive attribute, i.e., records with the same sensitive values are in the same bucket. Then the algorithm iteratively obtains the f buckets that currently have the largest number of records and selects one record from each of the f buckets to form a group. Each remaining record is then assigned to an existing group.
We show background knowledge attack on the anatomized tables. Suppose Alice knows that Bob's record belongs to the first group in Table II 
III. INJECTOR: MINING BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
FROM THE DATA In this section, we propose a novel approach to deal with background knowledge attack. We first identify the possible sources where an adversary may obtain additional background knowledge. Then we explain the rationale of our approach of mining background knowledge from the data and describe the Injector framework.
A. Background Knowledge
Since the background knowledge attack is due to additional information that the adversary has, it is helpful to examine how the adversary may obtain this additional knowledge.
In traditional settings of data anonymization, the adversary is assumed to know certain knowledge besides the released data, e.g., the quasi-identifier values of individuals in the data and the knowledge of whether some individuals are in the data. In the following, we identify a list of additional knowledge that an adversary may have.
First, the adversary may know some absolute facts. For example, a male can never have ovarian cancer.
Second, the adversary may have partial knowledge of the demographic information of some specific groups. For example, the adversary may know that the probability that young females of certain ethnic groups have heart disease is very low. This knowledge can be represented as patterns or association rules that exist in the data.
Third, the adversary may have some adversary-specific knowledge, which is available to the adversary for some reason. For example, an adversary may know some targeted victim in person and have partial knowledge on the sensitive values of that individual (e.g., Alice may know that his friend Bob does not have short breath problem since she knows that Bob runs for two hours every day). An adversary may get additional information from other sources (e.g., Bob's son told Alice that Bob does not have heart disease). This type of knowledge is associated with specific adversaries and the channel through which an adversary obtains this type of knowledge can be varied among different adversaries.
While adversary-specific knowledge is hard to predict, it is possible to discover the other two types of background knowledge. Now we describe our proposed approach.
B. Our Approach
The main problem of dealing with background knowledge attacks is that we are unaware of the exact knowledge that an adversary may have and we believe that requiring the background knowledge as an input parameter is not feasible as it places too much a burden on the user. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to model the adversary's background knowledge. Our approach is to extract background information from the data to be released. For example, the fact that male can never have ovarian cancer should manifest itself in the data to be released, and thus it should be possible for us to discover the fact from the data. Also, it is often the case that an adversary may have access to similar data, in which case patterns or association rules mined from one data can be an important source of the adversary's background knowledge on the other data. We are aware that we do not consider adversaryspecific knowledge. The specific knowledge that an adversary may have is hard to predict. Also, since the adversary cannot systematically obtain such knowledge, it is unlikely that the adversary knows specific knowledge about a large number of individuals.
With this background knowledge extracted from the data, we are able to anonymize the data in such a way that inference attacks using this background knowledge can be effectively prevented. For example, if one is grouping records together for privacy purposes, one should avoid grouping a male patient with another record that has ovarian cancer (or at least recognize that doing so does not help meet attribute disclosure privacy requirements).
One may argue that such an approach over-estimates an adversary's background knowledge, as the adversary may not possess all knowledge extracted from the data. We justify our approach through the following arguments. First, as it is difficult for us to bound exactly what the adversary knows and what she doesn't know, a conservative approach of utilizing all extracted knowledge of a certain kind is appropriate. Second, it is often the case that the adversary has access to similar data and knowledge extracted from the data can be the adversary's background knowledge on the other data. Finally, utilizing such extracted knowledge in the anonymization process typically results in (at least partial) preservation of such knowledge; this increases the data utility. Note that privacy guarantees are still met.
One intriguing aspect about our approach is that one can argue that it improves both privacy and data utility at the same time. Grouping a male patient with another record that has ovarian cancer is bad for privacy because it offers a false sense of protection; it is also bad for data utility, as it contaminates the data. By not doing that, one avoids introducing false associations and improves data utility. This is intriguing because, in the literature, privacy and utility have been viewed as two opposing properties. Increasing one leads to reducing the other.
C. The Injector Framework
We now present the Injector framework for data anonymization. Injector focuses on one type of background knowledge, i.e., a certain combination of quasi-identifier values cannot entail certain sensitive values. This type of background knowledge can be represented as negative association rules of the form "Sex=M= Disease=ovarian cancer" and we are able to discover them from the data using data mining techniques. Mining other types of knowledge from the data and using them in data anonymization is an interesting direction for future work.
Injector uses permutation-based bucketization as the method of constructing the published data from the original data, which is similar to the Anatomy technique [91 and the permutation-based anonymization approach [10] . The bucketization method first partitions tuples in the table into buckets and then separates the quasi-identifiers with the sensitive attribute by randomly permuting the sensitive attribute values in each bucket. The anonymized data consists of a set of buckets with permuted sensitive attribute values.
The Injector framework consists of two components: (1) mining negative association rules from the table and (2) using these rules in data anonymization. We discuss these two components in the following two sections respectively.
IV. MINING NEGATIVE ASSOCIATION RULES
In this section, we study the problem of mining negative association rules from the data. We first formalize our problem and introduce the expectation measure in Section IV-A. We present techniques for dealing with quantitative attributes in Section IV-B and describe the algorithm in Section IV-C.
A. Problem Formulation
Let T be a (1 < i < m) with vi C Di.
In the rules defined above, only values at the leaf level of the VGHs are involved in the predicate X. To allow rules to take values from any level of the VGH, we define extended attribute domains D' = Dj UEj, where Ej is the set of internal nodes of the VGH for the j-th attribute for 1 <j < m, and D±I Dmi+. A generalized negative association rule is an implication of the form X X= -iY, where Y is a predicate of the form Am±+ = s with s C D± +1 and X is a conjunction of predicates each of which is of the form Ai = vi (1 < i < m) with vi C D.
We now define "interestingness" of a negative association rule. Some traditional interestingness measures are based on support and confidence. Specifically, a rule is interesting if its support is at least minSup and its confidence is at least minConf where minSup and minConf are user-defined parameters. The rule X X* -iY has support s% if s% of tuples in T satisfy both X and -,Y. The rule X X= -,Y holds with confidence c% if c% of tuples which satisfy X in T also satisfy -,Y. If we denote the fraction of tuples that satisfy predicate Z as P(Z), then s% = P(X U -,Y) and c% = P(X u -Y)/P(X).
We observe that setting a single minSup value for different sensitive values would be inappropriate for our purpose. A frequent sensitive value is expected to occur with a high probability even in a small number of tuples; when this probability turns out to be small, it is an interesting rule. On the other hand, an infrequent sensitive value is expected to occur with a low probability even in a large number of tuples; even when this probability is small, the rule may not be interesting. Intuitively, we should set a larger minSup value for a negative association rule involving a frequent sensitive attribute value.
Based on this observation, we propose to use expectation instead of support as the measure of the strength of a negative association rule. Given a negative association rule X X Y, the number of tuples satisfying X is n * P(X) where n is the total number of tuples in T. Among these tuples, the probability that the sensitive value of Y occurs at least once is 1 -(1 p(y))n*P(X). We define this probability as the expectation of the rule. The rule X X= -,Y is interesting if it has expectation at least minExp, i.e., 1 -(1 p(y))n*P(X) > minExp, which is equivalent to P(X) > 1 log1 p(Y)(l minExp).
We now define our objective as finding all generalized negative association rules X X= -,Y that satisfy the following two requirements where minExp is a user-defined parameter and minConf is fixed to be 1.
* Minimum expectation requirement: P(X) > Sup y,
where Supy = 1 log1 p(y)(l -minExp).
* Minimum confidence requirement: P(X U -iY)/P(X) > mirnConf. Note to define the support of Z from t (denoted as P(Z, t)): (1) the product of the membership of each attribute value, i.e., P(Z,t) = Fi<i<qMem(Z[i],t[ai]) and (2) the minimum of the membership of each attribute value, i.e., P(Z, t) = minj<i<q Mem(Z[i], t[ai]). We adopt the first method to compute P(Z, t). Again, P(Z) = Et T P(Z, t). We are then able to use this support function to define the interestingness measures.
C. The Algorithm
As we have discussed in Section IV-A, the expectation requirement is equivalent to P(X) > Supy. We define minSup = minsCD 1+, Supy where Y is the predicate Ami+ = s. Then the problem of discovering interesting negative association rules can be decomposed into two subproblems: (1) Discovering all itemsets that involve only quasiidentifiers and have support at least minSup; (2) Finding all negative association rules satisfying the expectation and confidence requirements. We study the two problems in the rest of this section. Discovering Frequent Itemsets: We can efficiently solve this problem by modifying existing frequent itemset generation algorithm Apriori [13] or the FP-tree algorithm [14] . For There are polynomial time algorithms (e.g., path augmentation [15] ) for the maximum bipartite matching (MBM) problem. We denote MBM(g) as the procedure for solving the MBM problem given the bipartite graph constructed from g. Our algorithm iteratively invokes MBM procedure.
The algorithm is given in Figure 1 . 
The algorithm is given in Figure 2 . We now analyze its complexity. Let The dataset used in the experiments is the adult dataset from the UC Irvine machine learning repository, which is comprised of data collected from the US census. The description of the dataset is given in Table III .
Given the dataset, we compute both the corresponding anatomized tables and the injected tables. The anatomized tables are computed using the anatomizing algorithm described in [9] . To compute the injected tables, we first find negative association rules in the original dataset using different minExp values. In all our experiments, minConf is fixed to be 1. Figure 3 shows the results of negative association rule mining on the original data. lRl indicates the number of discovered negative association rules. No, N1, N2, N3, and N4 indicate the percentage of tuples that have 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 incompatible sensitive values, respectively. N>5 indicates the percentage of tuples that have at least 5 incompatible sensitive values. The negative association rules discovered from the data include, for example, {Workclass = Government}= -4 Occupation = Priv-house-serv} and {Education = Doctorate}= {Occupation = Handlerscleaners}. We then compute the injected tables using the bucketization algorithm described in Section V. We evaluate the performance of Anatomy and Injector on two parameters: (1) minExp value within the range (2) f value which ranges from 3 to 6 (the default value is 6). Since the anatomizing algorithm is a randomized algorithm, for each set of selected parameters, we run the anatomizing algorithm for 10 times and the average value is reported.
A. Background Knowledge Attack
To illustrate the effects of background knowledge attack on Anatomy and Injector, we count the number of tuples in the anatomized tables and the injected tables that have less than f possible sensitive values using the extracted negative association rules. These tuples are viewed as vulnerable to background knowledge attack.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 4 . In all experiments, Injector has no vulnerable tuples, indicating that Injector better protects the data against background knowledge attacks.
B. Efficiency
We compare the efficiency of computing the anatomized tables and the injected tables. The time for computing the injected tables consists of two parts: (1) the time for computing the negative association rules and (2) the time for computing the injected tables using the bucketization algorithm.
Experimental results are shown in Figure 5 . The time to compute the injected tables using the bucketization algorithm is roughly the same as the time to compute the anatomized tables using the anatomizing algorithm, usually within seconds.
The main efficiency issue of computing the injected tables lies in computing the negative association rules. However, computing the negative association rules using a variation of the FP-tree algorithm is fast enough for large datasets.
In the rest of this section, we compare Injector against Anatomy and show that Injector also improves data utility. The first set of experiments on data utility evaluates the errors in association rule mining. We mine positive association rules from the original data and the anonymized data. We use conviction [16] as the interestingness metric. Specifically, the conviction of X X* Y is defined as P(X)P(-iY)/P(XU-iY).
Both Apriori [13] and FP-tree [14] can be used to find all positive association rules that satisfy both minimum support and minimum conviction requirements. Two error metrics are evaluated in the experiments: confidence error and identification error.
To evaluate confidence error, we find the set of association rules R with sufficient support and conviction in the original Figure 6 . In all experiments, Injector has smaller confidence errors, indicating that Injector captures a larger amount of association between the quasi-identifiers and the sensitive attribute.
Errors in confidence estimation can have more pernicious effects. They can result in errors in the identification of interesting association rules, i.e., association rules that exist in the original data may be hidden in the anonymized data and association rules that do not exist in the original data may be erroneously identified in the anonymized data. This error is called identification error. To evaluate identification error, we perform association rule mining on all three tables: (1) Figure 7 . In all figures, Injector has smaller identification errors, indicating that Injector is more effective in identifying association rules.
D. Aggregate Query Answering
The second set of experiments on data utility evaluates the accuracy of aggregate query answering. We only consider the "COUNT" operator where the query predicate involves the sensitive attribute, as in [9] . It is also possible to compute other aggregate query operators such as "MAX" and "AVERAGE" on numerical attributes [10] . Specifically, the queries that we consider are of the form:
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM [3] , [4] , [5] first proposed the k-anonymity model which assumes that assumes that the adversary has access to some publiclyavailable databases (e.g., a vote registration list) from which she obtains the quasi-identifier values of the individuals. The model also assumes that the adversary knows that some individuals are in the table. Much of the subsequent work on data anonymization assumes to use this adversarial model. In [6] , [8] , the authors recognized that the adversary also has knowledge of the distribution of the sensitive attribute in each equivalence class and she may be able to infer sensitive values of some individuals using this knowledge. In [6] , the authors proposed the £-diversity requirement [6] which, however, does not satisfactorily prevent an adversary with background knowledge from learning important sensitive information. Recently, Li et al. [17] observed that the distribution of the sensitive attribute in the overall table should be public information and the adversary can infer sensitive information with this additional knowledge. They proposed the t-closeness requirement as a stronger notion of privacy against this morepowerful adversary. In [18] , Martin et al. proposed a formal language to express background knowledge about the data and a polynomial time algorithm for computing the disclosure risk in the worst case. However, this work does not consider the exact background knowledge that the adversary may have.
The second category of work aims at developing anonymization techniques to achieve the privacy requirements. One popular approach to anonymize the data is generalization and suppression [3] , [4] . In generalization, some generalization schemes [3] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] have the consistency property, which means multiple occurrences of the same value are always generalized in the same way, i.e., they are replaced with the same value. A serious defect of generalization that has been recognized by [23] , [24] , [8] is that experimental results have shown that many attributes have to be suppressed in order to guarantee privacy. A number of techniques [9] , [24] have been proposed to remedy this defect of generalization. On the other hand, some generalization schemes [25] do not have the consistency property. One example is the Mondrian [25] multidimensional k-anonymity. Another anonymization technique is clustering [26] , which typically groups records based on some distance metric. Recently, Xiao and Tao [9] proposed Anatomy as an alternative anonymization technique. Koudas et al. [10] explored the permutation-based anonymization approach and examined the anonymization problem from the perspective of answering downstream aggregate queries.
Several research works also consider background knowledge in other contexts. Yang and Li [27] studied the problem of information disclosure in XML publishing when the adversary has knowledge of functional dependencies about the XML data. In [28] , Lakshmanan et al. studied the problem of protecting the true identities of data objects in the context of frequent set mining when an adversary has partial information of the items in the domain. In their framework, the adversary's prior knowledge was modeled as a belieffunction and formulas were derived for computing the number of items whose identities can be "cracked". The problem of association rule mining was introduced by
Agrawal et al. [29] in the context of transactional database. A number of algorithms such as Apriori [13] and FP-Tree [14] have been proposed to discover interesting association rules. The generalization of association rule mining to multiple levels of hierarchies over items is studies in [30] , [31] . Association rules involving quantitative attributes are studied in [32] , [33] , [34] , [12] . [32] partitioned the domain of a numerical attribute into equi-depth intervals based on some quality metric. [33] proposed that the interestingness measure should consider the semantics of interval data. [34] studied the problem of mining association rules from data containing both categorical and numerical attributes. And [12] proposed to use fuzzy sets instead of intervals to deal with quantitative attributes. Negative association rule mining is studied in [I1], [35] . [11] proposed an algorithm for generating negative association rules based on a complex measure of rule parts. [35] generalized both positive and negative association rules to correlations and proposed the chi-squared test for correlation as an interestingness measure. Finally, [36] studied how to select the right measure for evaluating the interestingness of association rules.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
While recent work has shown that background knowledge attack can present disclosure risks to the anonymized data, no work has used background knowledge in data anonymization mainly because of the challenge of modeling the adversary's background knowledge.
In this paper, we explicitly consider and use background knowledge. Our approach first mines knowledge from the data and then uses the knowledge in data anonymization. One key advantage of our approach is that it protects the data against background knowledge attacks while improving data utility.
We have proposed the Injector framework which uses one type of knowledge (negative association rules). Our experimental results show the effectiveness of Injector in both privacy protection and utility preservation. Below we discuss some interesting open research issues.
A. Mining Other Knowledge from the Data It may be possible for us to discover knowledge from the data other than negative association rules. One type of knowledge is the summary statistics of the data. An example of this might be that the average salary of physical therapists is 70K. One direction of future work is to study how an adversary might use this additional knowledge to make more precise inferences and how we can use this knowledge in data anonymization to prevent these inference attacks. Also, how this would affect data utility is an interesting research problem. For example, we are able to discover positive association rules in the data. However, using positive association rules in anonymization would hide the association rules.
B. A General Model to Deal with Background Knowledge
The Injector framework considers only negative association rules with minConf = 1. A general framework would allow us to probabilistically model the adversary's background knowledge. It is an interesting direction to study how to compute the adversary's posterior knowledge in this framework and use these knowledge in data anonymization. In this framework, we can model both the adversary's posterior knowledge and prior knowledge as distributions of the sensitive attribute for all tuples. How to model the adversary's prior knowledge and how to compute the posterior knowledge, e.g., using Bayesian inference techniques, are interesting research problems.
C. Other Uses of Knowledge Mined from the Data
The extracted knowledge from the data might be useful for purposes other than anonymizing the data. For instance, we can use the extracted knowledge to guide the construction of generalization hierarchies. For example, attribute values with very different probabilities on some sensitive value should not be grouped together before they are combined with attribute values that have similar probabilities on the sensitive values. Investigating other uses of the exacted knowledge is an interesting research direction.
